McGrath, P. (2008). Moral disagreements and moral expertise. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (vol. 3, 87-108). Oxford: Oxford University Press. The enigma of differences between experts is most acute when it comes to what Jennifer Lackey calls „controversial areas,” such as. B than philosophy, politics, ethics and religion (Lackey 2018, p.

229). It is not uncommon to say that there is no expertise in these areas. However, substantive differences also threaten the natural and social sciences, and the conclusion that there are no experts in science is contrary to our current practice of assigning expertise. In the case of science, unlike a „controversial area” such as ethics, it can be said that we can use „independent controls” that are not the subject of major controversy (McGrath 2008, p. 97-98) to clarify the real experts in appearance. But divergences in science are commonplace and the natural sciences are not free of deep controversies, so the question of how to identify real experts in a particular area of science remains open in many cases. Footnote 1 Although it is possible to circumvent the problem and clarify the question of who the scientific experts are, in general, by using reputational criteria such as balance sheet, education, experience, publications, etc., the question of the objectivity of claims of knowledge remains intact in the face of apparently intractable differences. Dr. Afzalur, a professor at the University of Western Kentucky,[2] notes that there is no uniform and universally accepted definition of conflict.

[3] He notes that one of the issues in the dispute is whether the conflict is a situation or a type of behaviour. [4] Note, however, that these nine categories of disagreements are not entirely independent of each other. For example, the distinction between poor information processing methods and illogical reasoning may blur. A poor choice of definitions can also be an illogical form of thinking if these definitions are meaningless („Let`s define a squircle as a square circle”). And the distinction between standard information processing methods and information processing methods may be blurred, as the effectiveness of information processing methods may depend on the assumptions these methods make about the environment. It is also a possibility that there are disagreements that are not due to any of the nine reasons mentioned above (if they come across other types of disagreements with you, please post them in the comments below!). Carlos Santana talks about an alleged effect that ensues in „Do not agree that we disagree: the role of strategic differences in science.” Several philosophers have suggested in different ways that it may be advantageous for a scientific community to consist of scientists who maintain their position on a certain theory, even if their overall evidence indicates that a competing theory is probably more correct. In particular, it has been argued that scientists should be displaced by motivations, such as. B if the theory in question is taken up by other scientists, which, in turn, increases the spread of theories that are studied at a given time.